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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(j).
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Does the factual issue of whether the Mower/Lynn

Transportation agreement (hereinafter "Mower/Lynn Agreement") is an
integrated

contract

present

genuine

issues

of material

fact

requiring a reversal and setting aside of the summary judgment?
2.

Could a fact finder construe the contemporaneously

executed insurance order form and Mower/Lynn Agreement as one
contract requiring reversal of the summary judgment?
3.
executed

Does the parol evidence rule bar a contemporaneously

insurance

order

form

setting

forth

how

Worker's

Compensation would be obtained when the simultaneously executed
written contract is silent on the issue and does not set forth or
require a specific method for obtaining the Worker's Compensation
insurance coverage?
4.

Was the parol evidence rule correctly applied to bar

Mower's claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation and
breach

of

contract

against

Lynn

1

Transportation

Co.,

Inc.

(hereinafter "Lynn" or "Lynn Transportation") and Alexander &
Alexander (hereinafter "A&A")?
5.

Are

the

appellees

estopped

from

denying

their

obligation to purchase Worker's Compensation insurance for Mower
or, in the alternative, to notify him that they were unable to do
so?
6.

Even if a written integrated contract exists between

Lynn and Mower requiring Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation
coverage, does that bar Mower's claims against A&A for its failure
to provide the ordered Worker's Compensation insurance coverage or,
in the alternative, inform Mower that A&A could not obtain the
coverage?
7.

Did Mower fail to provide the notice required by

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (a) , and if not, does the failure
preclude Mower from suing the appellees for failure to provide the
ordered Worker's Compensation insurance or, in the alternative,
notify Mower that they could not obtain the insurance?
8.

Does

the Mower/Lynn

Agreement

entitle

Lynn to

recover its attorney's fees and costs?
9.

Is Lynn

Transportation

equitably

estopped

from

obtaining attorney's fees under its contract with Mower?
10.

Are there material issues of fact which require

reversal of the summary judgment?

2

Each of the foregoing issues were raised in the memoranda
supporting and opposing the parties' motions for summary judgment
(R. 172-187, 192-276, 395-446, 465-489, 565-570, 633-635).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

And in deciding whether

the trial court properly granted summary judgment, this Court
reviews the decision for correctness without any deference to the
trial court. E.g., CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.,
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989).

Further, whether the lower court

correctly determined that the contract at issue was an integrated
contract is reviewed for correctness, as is the question of whether
the lower court correctly applied the parol evidence rule.

Union

Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972). In addition, whether written
documents merged to form one contract is a question of fact and, on
an appeal of a summary judgment, the lower court's conclusion is
reviewed under a correction of error standard.
supra at 270.

Bullfrog Marina,

Whether Mower complied with Utah Code Ann. §35-1-

43(3)(a), and if not, whether the failure bars Mower's claims, are
issues of statutory construction reviewed under a correctness
standard.

See, generally. Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 259

U.A.R. 9, 10 (Utah 1995); Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d
3

1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services,
813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H
Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649-50 (Utah 1986). Moreover, whether
Lynn was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the contract at
issue is a question of contract construction and is reviewed for
correctness. E.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah
App. 1993); Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492,
493 (Utah App. 1991).
Finally, whether material fact issues exist is reviewed
de novo, and on review, the appellant is entitled to have all of
the facts presented and all of the inferences fairly arising
therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. Geneva Pipe
Co., supra.
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
A determinative rule is U.R.C.P. 56, a copy of which is
set forth in the Addendum to this Brief.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings,
and Disposition of the Lower Court
This is an appeal from two summary judgments.

One

judgment dismissed Keith H. Mower's ("Mower's") claims against Lynn
Transportation Co., Inc. and Alexander & Alexander, Inc. for breach
4

of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud (R.
565-570).
The other judgment awarded Lynn Transportation $34,398.52
in attorney's fees and costs as a result of the lower court's
interpretation of a contractual indemnification provision (R. 633635) .
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented
For Review
On appeal, Mower is entitled to have all of the facts

presented

and all of the inferences fairly arising therefrom

considered in a light most favorable to him.
Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).

Wineaar v. Froerer

Viewed in that light, the

facts are as follows:
Lynn Transportation is an Iowa trucking company doing
business in Utah (R. 177, 297-298, 333, 435). It employs its own
drivers and also contracts with independent owner/operators to
transport Lynn Transportation loads (R. 297, 299, 435-436).
Up until late 1989, Mower worked as a Lynn employee truck
driver (R. 435-436).

In April of 1990, Mower toyed with the idea

of

semi-truck/tractor,

buying

his

own

and

toward

that

end,

purchased one from Great Basin GMC (R. 436).
Following the purchase of his truck, Mower requested that
his former employer allow him to drive for it as an owner/operator
(R. 436). On April 12, 1990, Mower met with two company employees

5

— Comptroller Susan Archibeque and office worker Linda Murray (R.
423).

Archibeque presented the form contract, a copy of which is

attached in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 4 (R. 173, 181, 424).
The contract required Mower to obtain "Bobtail" and "Liability"
insurance coverage for liability and property damage. The contract
also required Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance (R.
172, 181). Paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement states:
The Contractor [Mower] shall obtain and
maintain in force and effect Workmen's
Compensation insurance . . . covering itself,
its drivers, driver's helpers and laborers
employed by it . . . . (R. 181, 416)
In

addition,

the

same

paragraph

contains

the

following

indemnification language:
Contractor [Mower] agrees to . . . indemnify
and Carrier [Lynn Transportation] harmless
from and against any claims, loss or damage
brought or alleged by Contractor or its
employees
against
Carrier
[Lynn
Transportation] for any injury, including
death, to Contractor
or
its employees
resulting from the performance of this
agreement. (R. 181, 416, 598)
After presenting

the form

contract

to Mower, Susan

directed him to Linda and her cubicle to discuss insurance.

Both

Susan and Linda told Mower that Lynn Transportation could obtain
insurance for him cheaper than he could obtain it for himself (R.
427, 466). Linda presented an insurance order form (copy attached
in the Addendum as Exhibit 5) prepared and given to her by A&A (R.
396,

418, 477).

A&A

is a Maryland

or Oklahoma

corporation

authorized to do business in Utah as an insurance brokerage (R.
297-298,

318,

337).

It

obtains

insurance

for

its clients,

including Lynn Transportation (R. 299, 318, 334, 467). However, it
has no offices in Utah. Instead, it provided insurance order forms
to Lynn Transportation for use by Lynn's employees and independent
contractors.

It provided the insurance order form at issue (R.

178, 183, 299, 336, 467-468).

A&A's order form contains the

following language:
COVERAGE DESIRED: Bobtail
Physical
Damage
Worker's Compensation
.
(R. 183)
In her deposition, Linda testified she told Mower that he
had to fill out the form to obtain insurance:
Q:
Did you tell him that that form had
to be filled out for him to get
insurance?
A:
Yes.
Q:

And you understood that form was
going to be used to obtain insurance
for him?

A:

Yes.

(Deposition of Linda Murray, 3-23-92, p. 13; R. 420.)
Mower checked
Bobtail,

Physical

all three insurance blanks, requested

Damage

and

Worker's

Compensation

insurance

coverage, and signed the A&A order form (R. 173, 178, 183, 300,
396, 425, 465). Mower described his subsequent conversation with
Linda as follows:
7

A:

She looked at Exhibit 4 [A&A's
insurance order form]. And she
says: You want us to provide
you
with
Workmen's
Compensation?
And I said:
Yes. And she said: Workmen's
Compensation,
you
are not
considered an employee of the
company.
Lynn Transportation
pays
for
the
Workmen's
Compensation insurance for our
drivers and for our employees.
You would have to be added to
this policy, and you would be
expected to pay the difference
between what the policy premium
is this month and what the
policy premium is next month,
you know, with you being added
onto it. And she says: It's
liable to be expensive. Do you
still want it?
I says: As
long as the company is taking
out my insurance, it would be
easier for me if all the
insurance was handled through
the company where I don't have
to fool with it and make checks
for it and stuff when I'm home.

(Deposition of Kirk Mower, 7-21-92, p. 113; R. 432, hereinafter
"Mower•s Depo., R.

".)

Mower further explained:
Q:

When Linda told you that she
would have to add a rider to
get you Worker's Compensation
. . . what did you say?

A:

. . . Let's get it handled.

(Mower's Depo. at 42 6-427.)

8

Mower summarized the five-minute conversation as follows:
"This is what I want."
Depo., R. 434.)

"You've got it.

Go see Susan."

(Mower's

Whereupon he did.

Susan asked Mower if he understood the written contract
provided to him before he was directed to meet with Linda.

Mower

replied that he did and signed it (R. 177, 182, 425). That same
day, Linda faxed the insurance order form to A&A (R. 306, 320, 376,
396, 420, 468) .
The order form ordering Worker's Compensation insurance
was received by A&A from Lynn Transportation with the Worker's
Compensation box checked.

(Id.)

In summary, the insurance form was completed at the same
time as the written contract and as part of the hiring process.
The insurance form and contract with Lynn Transportation were
signed contemporaneously and as part of the transaction wherein
Mower

became

employed

as

an

independent

contractor

of

Lynn

Transportation (R. 172, 177, 178, 298-300, 465-66).
According to Mower, Lynn Transportation represented that
it would send in the order form and that A&A would compute Mower's
premiums (R. 178, 188-89, 300-01, 466-67).
Lynn Transportation

told Mower that money would be

deducted from payments due to him for insurance ordered from A&A
(R. 173, 178, 301, 466). Lynn Transportation, in fact, deducted
money to pay for "insurance" (R. 173, 178, 301, 400, 466).
9

Mower reasonably believed that he had purchased W o r k e r s
Compensation insurance (R. 173-74, 178, 188-89, 302, 467). At no
time did Lynn Transportation or A&A inform Mr. Mower that:
(a)

He

could

not

purchase

Worker's

Compensation

insurance from A&A;
(b)

Worker's Compensation insurance had not been put in

(c)

Additional information was needed to put Worker's

force;

Compensation insurance in force;
(d)

Money was not being withheld to pay for Worker's

Compensation insurance, or that the money held out for insurance
did not purchase Worker's Compensation insurance (R. 173, 175, 178,
465, 466).
A&A never notified Mower that:
(a)

It did not sell Worker's Compensation insurance;

(b)

It was not going to obtain Worker's

Compensation

insurance for appellant;
(c)

It could not, or would not, obtain coverage for

appellant (R. 173, 175, 178, 468).
Mower

was

specifically

told

by

Lynn

Transportation

employees that:
(a)

He could obtain all necessary insurance through Lynn

Transportation

and

that

Transportation

would pay

their

insurance

agent,

A&A,

for the same with payroll
10

and

Lynn

deductions

(Affidavits of Kirk Mower dated 12/3/91 and 11/5/92; R. 178, 30004, 465);
(b)

Worker's Compensation was available through Lynn

Transportation (R. 178, 301, 466);
(c)

He could order all necessary insurance through Lynn

Transportation's agent, A&A (R. 178, 301, 466); and
(d)

Insurance ordered on the insurance form provided by

Lynn Transportation as to Mr. Mower would be ordered and he would
pay for the insurance through payroll deductions

(R. 301, 304,

466) .
Appellant

was

a novice

in purchasing

insurance,

and

reasonably relied upon A&A and Lynn Transportation to provide him
Worker's Compensation insurance or notify him that they could not
obtain the insurance for him.

Lynn Transportation knew that Mower

was driving the truck and that Mower was relying on it to obtain
Worker's Compensation insurance for him (R. 188-89, 302, 468).
On or about July

28, 1990, Mower was

injured

in an

accident while driving his tractor-trailer and hauling a load of
potatoes for Lynn Transportation.

As a result of the accident,

Mower's back has been fused and he is permanently disabled (R. 178,
302, 590, 622).
Subsequent to the accident, Mower learned for the first
time that he was not covered by Worker's Compensation

(R. 302).

Since part of his medical expenses were paid by the Utah Department
11

of Human Services under Medicaid, it has been joined as a party
plaintiff in this action (R. 297-310).
Mower sued Lynn Transportation and A&A for breach of
contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud (R. 216) .

Mower claimed that Lynn Transportation and A&A should have

provided

him

the

ordered

Worker's

Compensation

informed him that they could not get it.

insurance

or

Had Mower known that he

did not have Worker's Compensation insurance coverage, he would not
have driven his truck for Lynn Transportation

(R. 178, 302).

Claims for fraud and negligence are both fact-intensive.
summary judgment is rarely granted.

Thus,

Early on in the litigation,

A&A identified the following factual issues requiring a trial:
1.

Whether the form is an order form for Worker's

Compensation and whether it was a contract, or whether it was
provided as a courtesy service to Lynn Transportation contractors
(R. 196).
2.

The scope and nature of the insurance coverage

offered by Lynn Transportation and A&A and ordered by Mower is in
dispute (R. 197).
3.

Whether

Mower's

belief

that

he

had

Worker's

Compensation was reasonable (R. 198).
However, the factual issues identified by A&A did not
prevent Lynn Transportation and A&A from subsequently moving for
summary judgment (R. 447-50).

In support of their motion, they
12

presented two arguments.

First, they said that, "All of Mower's

theories of liability are in direct conflict with the express terms
of Mower's contract with Lynn." More specifically, they said that
(1) the contract required Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation;
(2) estoppel was inapplicable because the court cannot rewrite and
integrate a contract; (3) the parol evidence rule excluded the
representations made by Lynn's employees and the insurance order
form; and (4) Mower could not have reasonably relied upon the
employees' representations.

The second ground for the summary

judgment was that Mower had not provided the notice required by
Utah Code Ann. §31A-l-43(3) (a) so he could not have been damaged by
Lynn

Transportation's

and

A&A's

failure

to

obtain

Worker's

Compensation insurance coverage for him (R. 395-446).
The lower court determined that, "The contract between
Lynn Transportation and

. . . Mower

. . .

is an integrated

contract, and the parol evidence rule therefore bars evidence of
prior contemporaneous representations to vary the terms of the
contract."

(R. 565-66.)

The lower court then said:

It is undisputed that the form . . . was
signed prior to the time Mower signed the
written contract . . . .
The contract
unambiguously assigned the responsibility to
obtain Worker's Compensation to . . . Mower
(R. 566-67).
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded:
There is no genuine issue of material fact
that the written contract controls and the
13

duty to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance
rests with plaintiff Mower and not defendants
[Lynn Transportation and A&A]. (R. 567)
The court also said that Mower had not given the notice
required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(a), so "there is therefore
no genuine issue of material fact from which a fact finder could
conclude that the failure to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance
. . . resulted in any damage . . . ."
Thereafter,
judgment

on

an

Lynn

(R. 567.)

Transportation

indemnification

moved

clause.

for

summary

Specifically,

Lynn

Transportation said that it was entitled to attorney's fees and
court costs because Mower's claims arose from the performance of
his contract with Lynn (R. 595-607, 621, 624).
In response, Mower explained that the indemnification
clause did not apply because, "The claims of Mower did not arise
from the performance of the contract . . . ."
rejected

Mower's

argument

and

entered

(R. 618)

summary

The court

judgment

attorney's fees and costs on July 13, 1994 (R. 633-35).
timely appealed both Orders on August 5, 1994 (R. 63 6-37).

14

for
Mower

VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Whether the Mower/Lynn Written
Agreement Is An Integrated
Contract Presents Genuine Issues of
Material Fact Requiring Reversal
of the Summary Judgment,
Whether a written agreement is an integrated contract is
a question of fact requiring reversal of the summary judgment.
See, e.g. , Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah
1972) . Further, before the issue of integration can be resolved,
the fact finder must resolve the following three genuine issues of
material fact:

(1) whether the parties intended the insurance

order form and Mower/Lynn Agrfeement to be construed as one contract
(see Bullfrog Marina, supra at 270) ; (2) whether Mower would have
signed the Mower/Lynn Agreement if he had known that the insurance
order form would not be construed as part of the contract (see
Id.) ; and (3) whether misrepresentations were made to induce Mower
to sign the Mower/Lynn Agreement.
P. 2d 663, 666 (Utah 1995).

See Union Bank v. Svenson. 707

Since the lower court was presented

with the foregoing genuine issues of material fact, the lower
court's summary judgment is inappropriate and must be reversed.
See, generally, e.g., Jackson v. Righter, 259 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1995).
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POINT II
The Lower Court's Misapplication
of the Parol Evidence
Rule Does Not Justify the
Lower Court's Summary Judgment.
The lower court's application of the parol evidence rule
does not justify the summary judgment for the following reasons:
(1) as set forth in Point I, genuine issues of material fact must
be resolved before the parol evidence rule can be applied; (2) the
parol evidence rule does not bar Mower's claims against A&A because
A&A was not a party to the so-called integrated contract; (3) the
parol evidence rule does not bar claims for misrepresentation; (4)
the parol evidence rule does not bar negligence claims; and (5) the
representations made by Lynn's employees and the A&A order form
were not offered to vary the terms of the Mower/Lynn Agreement.
Since the misapplication of the parol evidence rule was the basis
for the lower court's summary judgment, the summary judgment must
be reversed.
POINT III
Whether Lynn Transportation Is Estopped
From Denying Its Promise to Obtain
Worker's Compensation For Mower
Creates Genuine Issues of Material
Fact Requiring Reversal of the Summary Judgment.
Promissory estoppel relates primarily to those informal
contracts which lack consideration but where, because of facts
surrounding the transaction, injustice can only be avoided by
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enforcing the promise.

Easton v. Wycoff. 4 Utah 2d 386, 388, 295

P.2d 332 (1956).
Application of the doctrine creates the following genuine
issues of material fact, each warranting a reversal of the summary
judgment:

(1) whether Lynn Transportation made a representation or

omission; (2) whether Mower reasonably and justifiably relied on
Lynn's representations, acts or omissions; and (3) whether Mower
changed his position to his detriment based on his reliance. Since
summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact, the lower court's summary judgments must
be reversed.
POINT IV
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-43(3)(a) Does
Not Bar Mower From Seeking Damages
Against Lynn Transportation
and A&A For Their Failure to
Provide the Ordered Worker's Compensation
Insurance Coverage Or Their
Failure to Notify Mower That
They Could Not Obtain the Coverage.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43 defines the terms "employee11,
"worker", "workman" and "operator."

It allows sole proprietors to

elect to include themselves as an employee under the Worker's
Compensation Act by giving notice to the Industrial Commission and
the sole proprietor's insurance carrier.

Notice statutes such as

§35-1-43 do not provide a defense to an insurance carrier seeking
to deny coverage.

See Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N. C.
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App. 1978).

It follows that notice statutes such as §35-1-43 are

no defense for an insurance brokerage such as A&A or a contractor
such as Lynn Transportation for failing to obtain the ordered
Worker's Compensation insurance coverage, nor could it be.

Mower

could not provide the statutory notice to his insurance carrier
until A&A and Lynn provided him an insurance carrier to notify.
POINT V
The Lower Court Misconstrued the Mower/Lynn
Agreement When It Awarded Lynn
Transportation Attorney's Fees and Costs.
When the indemnification clause at issue is strictly
construed, it becomes obvious that Mower's negligence and breach of
an oral contract claims do not result from the performance of the
Mower/Lynn written Agreement.

Since the indemnification clause at

issue does not apply to Mower's claims, the summary

judgment

awarding costs and attorney's fees pursuant to the indemnification
clause must be vacated.
POINT VI
Lynn Transportation is Estopped
From Seeking Indemnification
(Attorney's Fees) Under the
Mower/Lynn Agreement.
One of Mower's defenses to Lynn Transportation's claim
for attorney's fees under the Mower/Lynn Agreement is the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.
elements:

Equitable estoppel requires three factual

(1) a representation, act or omission; (2) justifiable
18

reliance; and (3) a change of position to one's detriment based on
the reliance,

Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754 P.2d 1222, 1225

(Utah 1988); United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982).

As set forth in the

Statement of the Case section of this Brief, the record shows that
each of the foregoing factual elements is present and/or disputed
in this case.

Thus, the existence of these genuine issues of

material fact requires a reversal of the summary judgment awarding
attorneyfs fees and costs under the Mower/Lynn Agreement.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Whether the Mower/Lynn Written
Agreement Is An Integrated
Contract Presents Genuine Issues of
Material Fact Reguiring Reversal
of the Summary Judgment.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
As set forth in the Statement of the Case section of this

Brief, Lynn and A&A obtained a summary judgment by arguing to the
lower

court that the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an integrated

contract justifying application of the parol evidence rule to bar
all of Mower's fact-sensitive claims.
contract

was

not

integrated;

that

Mower contended that the
the

parties

intended

the

insurance order form to be construed with the Mower/Lynn Agreement;
and that the representations made by Lynn's employees to induce
19

Mower to sign the contract all created genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the parties intended the Mower/Lynn Agreement as
a final expression of their agreement.

The lower court found that

the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an integrated contract, but it did not
consider the insurance order form or the representations of Lynnfs
employees in arriving at its conclusion (R. 565-570).
B.

Standard of Review
Whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is a complete integrated

contract is a question of fact.

E.g., Union Bank v. Swenson, 707

P.2d 663, 665, 666-67 (Utah 1985); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz,
501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972).

Whether a genuine issue of fact exists

is reviewed de novo, and on review, Mower is entitled to have all
of the facts presented and all of the inferences fairly arising
therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him.

E.g. ,

Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Insurance Co. , 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah
1986).
C.

Legal Analysis
Whenever, as in this case, a litigant insists that a

writing before the court is an integration, and asks for the
application of the parol evidence rule, the court must determine as
a question of fact whether the parties did, in fact, adopt a
particular writing or writings as the final and complete expression
of their bargain.

Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261,

501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972).

In resolving this genuine issue of
20

material

fact, parol evidence is admissible.

Union Bank v.

Swenson, 701 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
Additional genuine issues of material fact occur when, as
in this case, one party contends that two simultaneously executed
writings (the insurance order form and the Mower/Lynn Agreement)
should be construed together, and the other party contends that
only the last signed document was the agreement.

See Bullfrog

Marina, supra at 270-71, wherein the court stated:
In the instant action, the trial court found
after full consideration of the entire
transaction, including the purpose to be
served by the lease and the employment
contract, defendant would not have leased the
boats to plaintiff unless he could operate the
houseboat rental service.
*

*

*

The trial court did not err in following the
rule of law that when two or more instruments
are
executed
by
the
same
parties
contemporaneously or at different times in the
course of the same transaction, and concern
the same subject matter, they will be read and
construed together . . . .
Similarly, in this case, a fact finder could, and should,
find that the contemporaneously executed insurance order form and
the Mower/Lynn Agreement were part of the same transaction and
concern the same subject matter (Worker's Compensation insurance).
This genuine issue of material fact requires reversal of the
summary judgment.

See Bullfrog Marina, supra.
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Another genuine issue of material fact was created by the
Lynn employees' representations that they would order and obtain
Worker's Compensation for Mower through A&A. These representations
show that the Mower/Lynn Agreement was not intended to be a final
integration. Moreover, Mower's Affidavit alleges that he would not
have operated the truck under the Mower/Lynn Agreement without the
misrepresentations (R. 487) .

These allegations raise issues of

material fact requiring reversal of the summary judgment.

See

Union Bank v. Swenson, supra at 666.
POINT II
The Lower Court's Misapplication
of the Parol Evidence
Rule Does Not Justify the
Lower Court's Summary Judgment.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
Mower sued Lynn Transportation and A&A for their failure

to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance coverage for Mower or to
notify him that they could not obtain the coverage. Mower alleged
claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation,

fraud and

breach of contract (R. 297-310). As set forth in the Statement of
the Case section of this Brief, Lynn's employees told Mower that
they could obtain Worker's Compensation cheaper than he could and
that Worker's Compensation insurance premiums could be deducted
from Lynn settlement checks to Mower. They also provided him with
A&A's order form —

a form supplied by A&A to Lynn to be used by
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Lynn's employees and independent contractors.
were deducted from Mower's checks.

Insurance premiums

No one from Lynn or A&A told

Mower that he did not have Worker's Compensation insurance coverage
or that A&A and Lynn could not obtain Worker's
insurance coverage for him.

Compensation

Mower reasonably believed that Lynn

and A&A had secured the Worker's Compensation insurance coverage.
Had he known differently, he would not have driven the truck until
coverage was secured (R. 487).
Despite all of that, the lower court granted summary
judgment dismissing the foregoing fact-sensitive claims. The Court
first

found

that

the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an

integrated

contract, and then reasoned that since it is undisputed that Mower
signed A&A's

insurance order form just before he signed the

Mower/Lynn Agreement, "There is no genuine issue of material fact
that controlled

and the duty to obtain Worker's

Compensation

insurance rested on Mower and not Lynn or A&A" (R. 567).
B.

Standard of Review
Whether the lower court correctly applied the parol

evidence rule is viewed for correctness with no deference to the
trial court.
C.

Bullfrog Marina, supra: Union Bank, supra.

Legal Analysis
1.

Introduction
The parol evidence rule has a narrow application.

rule

operates

in

the

absence
23

of

fraud

only

to

The

exclude

contemporaneous statements or representations offered for the
purpose of varying the terms of an integrated contract.

Union

Bank, supra at 665. As hereinafter set forth, there are numerous
reasons why the parol evidence rule does not justify the lower
court's summary judgment.
2.

Whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement Is An Integrated
Contract Is a Factual Issue Which Creates Genuine Issues
of Material Fact, So the Court Should Not Have Applied
the Parol Evidence Rule.
The Court may apply the parol evidence rule only when

there is an integrated contract.
cannot be applied when there

Bullfrog, supra at 270.

It

is a dispute over whether the

agreement is an integrated contract. Union Bank, supra at 666-668.
As set forth in Point I of the Argument section of this Brief,
whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is an integrated contract is a
question of fact, and there are numerous genuine issues of material
fact that must be determined to resolve this ultimate fact issue.
Thus, the Court should not have applied the parol evidence rule.
The court's premature application of the rule requires a reversal
of the lower court's summary judgment.
3.

Union Bank, supra.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Mower's Claims
Against A&A Because A&A Was Not a Party to the Mower/Lynn
Agreement.
The parol evidence rule applies only to those who are

parties to the written contract. E.g., Kimmel v. Iowa Realty Co.,
339 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Iowa 1983); Denha v. Jacob, 446 N.W.2d 303,
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306 (Mich. App. 1989); Sullivan v. Estate of J. C. Eason, 558 So.2d
830, 832 (Miss. 1990) . Since A&A was not a party to the Mower/Lynn
Agreement, the parol evidence rule cannot possibly bar Mower's
claims for negligence and breach of contract (order form) against
A&A.

Thus, that part of the summary judgment dismissing Mower's

claims against A&A must be reversed.
4.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Claims for Fraud
And/Or Negligent Misrepresentation.
The parol evidence rule operates "in the absence of

fraud."

Bullfrog Marina, supra at 270 (emphasis added).

not bar a claim for fraud.

It does

Union Bank, supra at 665; see Berkeley

Bank For Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (1981).

Nor does it

bar a plaintiff from showing that misrepresentations were made
either intentionally or negligently which caused the innocent party
to sign the agreement.

See Union Bank, supra at 666.

In this case, there is evidence that Lynn Transportation
misrepresented to Mower that it would obtain Worker's Compensation
for Mower and that Mower could pay for it by deductions from his
settlement

checks;

that

Mower

reasonably

relied

on

the

misrepresentation and was induced by the misrepresentation to sign
the contract; that Mower's belief was reasonable; and that as a
result of his reliance on the misrepresentations, he was damaged.
Since the record factually establishes a prima facie case of fraud
and/or negligent misrepresentation, the lower court should not have
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applied the parol evidence rule to bar these claims.

Since the

erroneous application of the parol evidence rule was the primary
basis for the lower court's summary judgment, the summary judgment
should be reversed.
5.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Negligence
Claims.
The parol evidence rule is a narrow principle of contract

interpretation.
contract claims.

Union Bank, supra at 665.

Restatement Contracts (Second) §213.

codified in Utah's Uniform Commercial Code.
§70A-2-202.

It is applied to
It is

See Utah Code Ann.

However, it has no application to torts.

See 9

Wigmore, Evidence §§2401, 2404 (Chadborne Rev. 1981) (rule applies
to jural acts).
Mower is clearly entitled to recover for the negligence
of Lynn Transportation and A&A in failing to effect Worker's
Compensation coverage for Mower. E.g., Fiorentino v. The Travelers
Insurance Co. , 448 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978); State Farm
Insurance Co. v. Fort Wayne National Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524 (Ind.
App. 1985) ; Connell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 482
So.2d 1165 (Ala. 1985); Zitelman v. Metropolitan Insurance Agency,
482 A.2d 426 (D.C. App. 1984); Hunter v. State of Florida, 391
So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 1981); Clary Insurance Agency v. Doyle, 620
P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980); Stuart v. National Indemnity Co., 7 Ohio
App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158 (1982).
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To recover, Mower must show:
(1)

Negligence in the representation

of the type or

extent of coverage to be obtained;
(2)

Reliance on the agent's representation in ordering

(3)

Loss as a result of misrepresentation; and

(4)

Justifiable

insurance;

reliance

on misrepresentation.

See

Fiorentino, supra at 1369.
Since the parol evidence rule does not bar a negligence
claim, and since a factual dispute exists as to all of the above
elements, the summary judgment must be reversed.
6.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Contemporaneous
Representations Or Writings When They Are Not Offered to
Vary the Terms of the Contract.
In

this

case,

the

representations

made

by

Lynn's

employees and the insurance order form were not offered to vary the
terms of the Mower/Lynn Agreement.

The Agreement does not specify

how Mower is to obtain the Worker's Compensation insurance required
by

the

Agreement.

It

is

silent

on

the

issue.

Thus,

the

representations and insurance order form should have been allowed
to

show

how

Mower

was

to

obtain

insurance.
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the

Worker's

Compensation

POINT III
Whether Lvnn Transportation Is Estopped
From Denying Its Promise to Obtain
Worker's Compensation for Mower Creates
Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Requiring Reversal of the Summary Judgment.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
In responding to Lynn Transportation's and A&A's motion for

summary judgment, Mower said that Lynn Transportation was estopped
from denying its promise to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance
for Mower.

As set forth in the Statement of the Case section of

this Brief, Lynn's employees told Mower that they could purchase
all of the necessary insurance for him, provided him the insurance
order form submitted to them by A&A, and told Mower that his
Worker's Compensation premium would be deducted from his settlement
checks.

Mower and an insurance expert both said that Mower had

reasonably relied on the foregoing promises and was induced not to
obtain Worker's Compensation insurance in some other way, all to
his detriment (R. 188-91).

The lower court did not specifically

address the promissory estoppel issue in its Order granting summary
judgment.
B.

Standard of Review
Whether the lower court correctly applied or failed to

apply

the

doctrine

correctness.

of

promissory

estoppel

is

reviewed

for

See Petty v. Gindv Manufacturing Corp., 404 P.2d 30,

33 (Utah 1965).
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C.

Legal Analysis
Promissory estoppel relates primarily to those informal

contracts which lack consideration but where, because of the facts
surrounding the transaction, injustice can only be avoided by
enforcing the promise.
P.2d 332 (1956).

Easton v. Wycoff. 4 Utah 2d 386, 388, 295

Estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice when one

has reasonably relied to his detriment on a representation or
omission.

See United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First

National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982). Generally, to invoke
the doctrine requires the presence of three factual elements:

(1)

a representation, act or omission; (2) justifiable reliance; and
(3) a change of position to one's detriment based on the reliance.
These are factual issues.

See Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754

P.2d 1222, 1224-25 (Utah 1988).
The case law is clear in holding that where an insurance
broker or agent agrees to procure a policy under circumstances
which would lead an applicant to believe that insurance has been
obtained,

the

undertaken.

law

requires

the

agent

to

perform

the

duty

State Farm Insurance Co. v. Fort Wavne National Bank,

474 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1985); Sheridan v. Greenberg, 391 So.2d
234 (Fla. App. 1981) ; Stuart v. National Indemnity Co. , 7 Ohio
App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158 (1982).
Since the decision of whether to apply the doctrine of
promissory estoppel in this case to prevent Lynn Transportation
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from denying its promise to obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower
creates the foregoing genuine issues of material fact, the summary
judgment must be reversed.
POINT IV
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-43(3)(a) Does
Not Bar Mower From Seeking Damages
Against Lynn Transportation
and A&A For Their Failure to
Provide the Ordered Worker's Compensation
Insurance Coverage Or Their
Failure to Notify Mower That
They Could Not Obtain the Coverage.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
Under the Mower/Lynn Agreement, Mower agreed to obtain

Worker's Compensation insurance covering himself and his employees.
Under the A&A order form, Mower ordered Worker's Compensation for
himself and his employees from A&A.

Neither Lynn Transportation

nor A&A ordered the Worker's Compensation insurance or notified
Mower

that

they

could

not

obtain

the Worker's

Compensation

insurance for him.
In its summary judgment Order, the lower court found as
a fact that Mower did not notify the insurance carrier or the
Industrial Commission, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3)(a). From the foregoing, the Court concluded that Mower could
not be damaged by Lynn Transportation's and A&A's failure to obtain
the ordered Worker's Compensation insurance or, in the alternative,
their failure to notify Mower that they could not obtain the
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insurance. The record shows no legal support for the lower court's
novel construction of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(a).
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court's interpretation

of a statute on a correctness of error basis without deference.
Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 259 U.A.R. 9, 10 (Utah 1995);
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989);
Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah
App. 1991).
C.

Legal Analysis
Section 35-1-43 defines the terms "employee", "worker",

"workmen" and "operator" as used in this [Worker's Compensation]
statute.

Subsection (3)(a) provides that a "sole proprietorship

may elect to include as an employee under this chapter . . . the
owner of the sole proprietorship."

If the sole proprietor makes

the election, it is directed to serve notice of it upon its
insurance carrier and upon the Industrial Commission.
proprietor

is

considered

an

employee

under

the

No sole
Worker's

Compensation statute until the notice has been given. The statute
does not specifically preclude a sole proprietor from obtaining
Worker's Compensation insurance or suing those who have agreed to
provide Worker's Compensation insurance, but then failed to do so,
nor could it.

Mower could not possibly notify his insurance
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carrier, as required by §35-1-43(3)(a), until his brokers, Lynn and
A&A, provided Mower an insurance carrier.
In addition, Mower is not seeking damages for any right
or privilege granted under Utah's Worker's Compensation statute.
Thus, whether he is considered an employee under the statute is
immaterial. What Mower is seeking are damages that are proximately
caused by Lynn's and A&A's negligent

failure to provide the

insurance that would cover him in the event of a worker accident,
and their failure to notify him that they could not obtain the
coverage.

Mower also seeks the same damages under a breach of

contract claim.
Moreover,

there

are

no

reported

cases

wherein

an

insurance broker like A&A or a contracting party like Lynn has
attempted to use a statutory notification provision as a defense
for a failure to provide the insurance coverage.

However, in

Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N. C. App. 1978), the North
Carolina Appeals Court held that an insurance carrier was estopped
from using a similar notice statute as a defense to a demand for
Worker's Compensation insurance coverage.

Simply put, coverage

does not depend upon compliance with the notice statute, but on the
terms of the policy itself.
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POINT V
The Lower Court Misconstrued
the Mower/Lynn Agreement When
It Awarded Lynn Transportation
Attorney's Fees and Costs*
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
The indemnification clause at issue reads:
[Mower] agrees to
indemnify [Lynn
Transportation] from and against any claims,
loss or damage . • . for any injury . . . to
[Mower] resulting from performance of this
agreement.

Lynn Transportation argued that the foregoing requires Mower to pay
Lynn's attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against
Mower's claims (R. 598-607).

Mower responded that his claims did

not arise from the performance of the Mower/Lynn Agreement, and
that instead, the claims resulted from Lynn's negligent failure to
obtain Worker's Compensation insurance coverage and from its breach
of an oral agreement (R. 617-620) . The lower court ruled that the
foregoing indemnification clause required Mower to pay Lynn's
attorney's fees and costs (R. 633-35).
B.

Standard of Review
Whether the terms of an indemnification agreement are

ambiguous and whether the trial court properly interpreted an
indemnification

agreement

are

legal

conclusions

reviewed

for

correctness. Scudder v. Kennecott Corp.. 858 P. 2d 1005, 1008 (Utah
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App. 1993); Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492,
493 (Utah App. 1991).
C.

Legal Analysis
The law is clear that indemnification agreements are

strictly construed against the drafter.

Freund v. Utah Power &

Light Co. , 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990); Scudder v. Kennecott
Corp., 858 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah App. 1993).

This is particularly

so when, as in this case, the negligent party attempts to shift the
financial responsibility for its own negligence.
Smith Management Corp. . Ill

Pickhover v.

P. 2d 664 (Utah App. 1989).

In this

case, there is a factual presumption against an intent to indemnify
unless it is clearly and unequivocally expressed.
Consulting

Engineers, Inc., 820

P.2d

492

Gordon v. CRS

(Utah App.

1991).

Indemnification is not achieved by inference or implication from
general language.

Pickhover, supra at 667.

The indemnification

provision at issue specifically requires Mower to indemnify Lynn
only when the claim, loss, damage or injury "results from the
performance of this agreement."
However, the claims, injury and damage set forth in
Mower's Complaint did not arise from the performance of the
Mower/Lynn Agreement.

The claims arose out of Lynn's negligent

failure to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance or to notify
Mower that it could not do so.
separate

The claims also arose from a

oral agreement or promise to purchase
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the Worker's

Compensation

insurance

for Mower.

Thus, the

indemnification

language does not apply in a summary judgment awarding attorney's
fees and costs under the indemnification clause, and must be
vacated•
POINT VI
Lynn Transportation Is Estopped From
Seeking Indemnification (Attorney's
Fees) Under the Mower/Lynn Agreement.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
After Lynn Transportation obtained a summary judgment

dismissing Mower's claims, it moved for an order granting summary
judgment on the issue of attorney's fees.

Lynn said that the

following paragraph entitled him to fees:
[Mower] agrees to
indemnify [Lynn
Transportation] from and against any claims,
loss or damage . . . for any injury . . . to
[Mower] resulting from performance of this
agreement.
In response, Mower replied that Lynn was equitably
estopped

from

specifically,

enforcing
Mower

the

said

contract

that

Lynn

provisions.
made

the

More
following

misrepresentations and/or omissions: (1) Lynn Transportation would
obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower and allow Mower to pay for
the premiums with deductions from his settlement checks; (2) it
ordered the insurance from A&A for Mower; (3) Lynn Transportation
deducted

insurance

premiums

from

Mower's

checks;

(4)

Lynn

Transportation never told Mower that it had not purchased Worker's
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Compensation insurance or that it was not able to obtain Worker's
Compensation insurance for Mower; and

(5) Lynn never required

additional proof of Worker's Compensation coverage from Mower. The
record also shows that Mower reasonably relied on the foregoing
representations and omissions (R. 188-89).

In addition, there is

no factual dispute that Mower changed his position to his detriment
based on the reliance; that is, had he not reasonably relied on
Lynn's representations and omissions, he would have purchased
Worker's Compensation from some other source before driving his
truck. However, the lower court, in granting summary judgment, did
not address the equitable estoppel issue.
B.

Standard of Review
Whether the trial court properly applied or failed to

apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel is reviewed de novo under
a correctness standard.

See Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754

P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988).
C.

Legal Analysis
Equitable estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice when

one

has

reasonably

relied

to

his

detriment

on

a

negligent

misrepresentation or omission. See United American Life Insurance
Co. v. Zions First National Bank, supra; Celebrity Club, Inc. v.
Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (1979).
Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting
rights when another party has justifiably relied on the acts,
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omissions, representations or statements of the party or changed
positions so that he will suffer injury if the former party is
allowed to repudiate his contract.
elements must be present:

Rothey. supra at 1224.

Three

(1) a representation, act or omission;

(2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change of position to one's
detriment based on the reliance. These are factual issues. Id. at
1225; United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National
Bank. 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982).
In the lower court, Lynn asserted that by his contract,
Mower agreed to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance and to
indemnify Lynn Transportation from all claims presented in this
lawsuit.

Mower responded that Lynn Transportation was equitably

estopped to claim the benefits of the contract indemnification
language.

"The general rules of estoppel apply to the operation

and effect of a contract of indemnity as between indemnitor and
indemnitee."

Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. , 754 P.2d 1222,

1224 (Utah 1988) .
To invoke equitable estoppel, a party need only show
conduct by another party which leads him, in reliance thereon, to
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the
first party is allowed to repudiate its contract.

E.g., United

American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National Bank. 641 P.2d
158, 161 (Utah 1982); Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
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Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Mendez v. State Dept. of
Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991).
In the present case, the facts and reasonable inferences
set forth in the Statement of the Case and summarized in the
Factual and Procedural Background set forth above show all of the
elements of equitable estoppel.

Clearly, Lynn Transportation was

negligent in failing to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance for
Mower.
The facts show that Mower relied on a false, negligent
representation by Lynn Transportation (that Worker's Compensation
insurance would be obtained if Mower checked the box to order such
coverage).

Clearly, Mower relied on this promise.

turned out to be false.

The promise

The fault for lack of coverage clearly

lies with Lynn Transportation and A&A, whose negligence created a
non-insured situation. Estoppel must be invoked herein to prevent
a manifest injustice to Mower. Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control

Commission,

supra: Mendez

v.

State

Dept.

of

Social

Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Eldredae v. Utah
State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990).
At a bare minimum, the issues of misrepresentation and
reasonable

reliance

present

genuine

issues

of material

fact

requiring reversal of the summary judgment awarding indemnification
and attorney's fees.

See Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51

Wash. App. 423, 754 P.2d 120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988); see also,
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Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah
App. 1991).
X.
CONCLUSION
The

summary

judgment

dismissing

Mower's

breach

of

contract, negligence and fraud claims should be dismissed because:
(1) whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is an integrated contract
presents numerous genuine issues of material fact; (2) the lower
court's misapplication of the parol evidence rule does not justify
the summary judgment; (3) whether the appellees are estopped from
denying their promise to obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower
creates genuine issues of material fact; and (4) Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-43(3)(a)'s notice provisions do not bar Mower's claims.
The summary judgment awarding Lynn Transportation's costs
and attorney's fees should be reversed because the lower court
misconstrued the indemnification provision, and Lynn Transportation
is estopped from seeking indemnification under the Mower/Lynn
~

Agreement.
Respectfully submitted this % ( day of

MdKCM

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellants
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JAN 2 6 1993
George W. Pratt (USB #2642)
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Lynn Transportation Company, Inc.
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3200
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OteufyQeric

Terry M. Plant (USB #2610)
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Alexander & Alexander
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KIRK H. MOWER and the -UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,"
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, an
Oklahoma corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah; and LYNN
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., an
Ohio corporation,

Civil No. 910905824CV
Honorable Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
LYNN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
Counterclaimplaintiff,

Hit copy

vs.
KIRK H. MOWER,
Counterclaimdefendant.

This matter came before the Court on defendants* joint motion for summary judgment
on December 4, 1992 at 9:30 a.m. In addition, defendant Lynn Transportation's motion to
strike the affidavits of Jerry Anderegg, in which defendant Alexander & Alexander had
joined, had been submitted to the Court for a decision. Based on the memoranda and other
materials submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows:
1.

The motion to strike the affidavits of Jeny Anderegg is granted for the reasons

stated in defendant's motion. However, even if those affidavits were admitted, the
undisputed facts would still mandate the following summary judgment.
2.

The Court determines that the contract between Lynn Transportation and

plaintiff Mower attached as Exhibit "A* to plaintiffs complaint is an integrated contract, and
that the parol evidence rule therefore bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous
representations to vary the terms of that contract. The Court determines, pursuant to 4501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, that it is undisputed that the form attached
as Exhibit "B" to plaintiff Mower's Amended Complaint was signed prior to the time Mower
signed the written contract with Lynn attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs complaint. The
2*J76.l

2

written contract identified as Exhibit "A * unambiguously assigned the responsibility to obtain
worker's compensation insurance to plaintiff Mower. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue
<

ntract controls and the duty to obtain worker's

compensation insurance rested with plaintiff Mower, and not defendants.
3.

lij iiiMiiiu , iiui i mil fetennines lhai if is undisputed that Mower was a sole

proprietor of his business and that he failed to give notice either to the Industrial Commission
or to any insurance carrier of his alleged desire

i to himself co »/ered under any

workers' compensation insurance policy. Thus, plaintiff Mower would not have been
covered by a workers' compensation insurance policy even if defendants

- for

CTvr iiicfi notice to the Industrial Commission and the insurance
carrier is imposed upon the sole proprietor. Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-43(3)(a). ['here is
therefore no genuine

a factfinder could conclude that

defendants' alleged failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance for plaintiff resulted in
any damage to plaintiff.

:*0T6 1

3

A

pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

determines that the defendants Lynn Transportation and Alexander & Alexander are entitled
to summary judgment in their

aintiffc Mower and the Department of

Human Services on all causes of action in plaintiffs amended complaint alleged against
defendants. The Court hereby

;idgment

GRAJ>

SO ORDERED.
Dated this ^4»

day qf^
BY THE C(

24Q76.1
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Tal

JUL 13 m
By.

George W. Pratt (USB #2642)
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Lynn Transportation Company, Inc.
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KIRK H. MOWER and the "UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,"
:
:
:
vs.
:
:
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, an Oklahoma :
corporation qualified to do business in the State :
of Utah; and LYNN TRANSPORTATION
:
COMPANY, INC., an Ohio corporation,
:

ORDER

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

Civil No. 910905824CV
Honorable Richard H. Moffat

:

LYNN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
Counterclaim-plaintiff,
vs.
KIRK H. MOWER,
Counterclaim-defendant.

Transportation Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde

presided. Based upon the a *
on file, the court GRANTS defendant's motion.
Accordingl) , it is herebj 01 dei ed, a nd the clerk is • directed to prepare and e liter a
Judgment, as follows:
1 > Summary Jiul^nu'iil is gianied nil

LMIII

JYanspniuiinn's l;irsi Claim loi relief,

in favor of Defendant Lynn Transportation and against plaintiff Kirk H. Mower, in the
amount of '

rwenty-Six Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents,

($32,526.83), based on the indemnity provision in the contract between Lynn Transportation
and Kirk I I I\ lower, attached as Exhibit A to Mower's Complaint.
2) In addition, Summary Judgment is granted on Lynn Transportation's Second
Claim for relief, b favrr of DefendantT ~— Transportation and against plaintiff Kirk H.
Mower, in the
Cents, ($1,871.69), requiring a total Judgment on Lynn Transportation Co., Inc.'s First and
Second Chiiits tor leiicl in die .muujnl oi Tinny F'Hir
Eight Dollars and Fifty-Tu

89354.1

Cents ($34,398.52).

2

PIOUKJIKI,

rim.r Hundred Ninety

3) Lynn Transportation's Third Claim for Relief is hereby ordered DISMISSED
without prejudice.
All amounts to bear interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry.
So Ordered.

/ ^ ?

^f

^

BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Edward T. Welli"
Attorney for Plaintiff Kirk H. Mower

Attorney for Defendant Alexander & Alexander

39354.1
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Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
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from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment,
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
C l t e d in U t a h S a n d & Gravel

Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J R W
' E n t e r s " I n c - v* N a e f > 6 0 4 R 2 d 4 ^
( U t a h 1979)
> K a t z v- P i e r c e > 7 3 2 P -2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. J u r . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.

§

F
t0
f™
*?* ™tice °ff W * » t i o n for def
fault J u d ^ ^ t where no ice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment <$=» 92 to 134

V . l t - 4 1 9 2 1 C 3 J . S . Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to iiability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
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Rule 56

forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56. F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Improper party plaintiff.
ANALYSIS
Issue of fact.
Affidavit.
—Notice.
—Contents.
—Corporate existence.
—Corporation.
—Deeds.
—Experts.
—Lease as security.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
Judicial attitude.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Motion for new trial.
Resting on pleadings.
Motion to dismiss.
—Objection.
Motion to reconsider.
—Sufficiency.
Notice.
Hearsay and opinion testimony
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Waiver of defect.
—Unpleaded defenses.
Procedural due process.
—Verified pleading.
Purpose.
—Waiver of right to contest.
Scope.
—When unavailable.
Summary judgment improper.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Who may make.
—Dispersal of interest.
Affirmative defense.
—Findings by court.
Answers to interrogatories.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
Appeal.
—Fraud or duress.
—Adversely affected party.
—Guardianship.
—Standard of review.
—Mortgage note.
Attorney's fees.
—Negligence.
Availability of motion.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
Compliance with rule.
—Note.
Cross-motions.
—Recovery for goods and services.
Damages.
—Stock ownership.
Discovery.
—Wrongful possession.
Disputed facts.
Summary judgment proper.
Evidence.
—Contract action.
—Facts considered.
—Contract terms.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Deceit.
—Weight of testimony.
—Jurisdiction.
Implicit rulings.
—Negligence.

Tab 4

..........?. •nr« r > e •"oimagea to )ta own equipment. CARRIE* n >
.— . . . ^ . • > V M I T « n s n o « * t ' IP' CONTRACTOR i equipment uted *n mc pcrtormence • ' inis A f c r m r n i .
t;

wnenmewngintementtioa:. . ©nCARRiER $ trailers. CONTRACTOR than be responti*<t ; © C A A R I E * i 0 f damage.loss end/or melt of me :
K i E * » equipment ano/or c o * i t en»m pan* ceutrd by cereie»*nets.neo-gence.imB>»©B>er usage eno/ore.*wie ©I ee»d equipment, except »nme
o' an aec'dani liability win noi » i t * » d a deductible of 1500 and lurme' agrees:
•

Not io matt any altarthens. enenges or modifications to CARRIER a equipment, except as may ba necess»ry to comply with applicant re >
tloni. without written consent el CARRIER.

0 To immediately ramose flit hrai to pr©*©nt irreparable damage and loss o( said Urea.
t . To return CARRIER* equipment with aama tires thai woia mounted on said eovipment at time CONTRACTOR or its egentt took p o u e m t
aame. In the evenl foreign t»ret are found on CARRIER a aoulpmenl. CONTRACTOR will a* M i d liable.
d. To use CARRIER'! oqurpment only In (ho ordinary eovrta of CARRIER i business at a me>te>r common or contract caviar.
In the event of aucn loas to the CARRER. the lost win ba deducted from CONTRACTORS eetUement. CARRIER will make amenable to CONTR
TOR a wrliian explanation and itemization of any deducnoni for uamane to CARf..ER*e aqulpment prior to or •( the time such deductions u m i
13. The CONTRACTOR tnatl be reiponiible and liable to CARRIER and agrees lo pay for ehoriage of. i o n of. or damage to cargo tremponed by CC
TRACTOR m the f o n t that tveh mortage, lott or damage it caused directly or indirectly by the operation* of CONTRACTOR or lit employee
• g e n u . Such monial t h i l l ba dadudad from any monies due CONTRACTOR under this Agreement. CARRIER will make available to CON7RTOR a written e«pienet»©n and Herniation of any deductions for cargo or property damage prior to or at me lima auch deduction! a'c maos
If any lea***, anprtagei Of damages lo cargo are brought Io the attention of CONTRACTOR on delivory. CONTRACTOR shall first notify CAR*;
and oblam authorisation prior to signing any delrvefy receipts or similar documents acknowledging the lossot. Shortages or damages to ct
Failure to do so on CONTRACTOR a part shall make CONTRACTOR liable for the loasoi. ahortagas. or damages to cargo.
14. The CARRIER may require CONTRACTOR to deposit with the CARRIER Five Hundred Dollars (1500.00) to be placed in an escrow fund. The ft
that! be established by depositing 12S.00 per week from paymtnls due CONTRACTOR under this Agreement until auch limt at a loin of SSOC
has been accumulated. Additional deposits shall ba made from payments due CONTRACTOR as necessary to maintain a balance of 1500 OC. Ur
cancellation of this Agreement, (he escrow fund wilt be used to dear CONTRACTOR'S aecounl. Any cherges to or purcneses made by me CC
TRACTOR from CARRIER will be deducted from the escrow fund and the balance win ba paid to CONTRACTOR within forty-five (45) days of c >
collation of this Agreement, in the event CARRIER temporarily advances funds to CONTRACTOR so aa to enable CONTRACTOR to fuitii:
Obligation! vt\a*t Paragraph S of tnia Agreement, aucn advances mall be contidered as reductions In the escrow account until repaid. CARR:
thalf provide to CONTRACTOR »r\ accounting of any tramaction involving the oserow fund. This accounting will be provided upon CONTRA
TOR'S reuuest at any time and m i l l Ineluue an deductions or additions made to the escrow fund Interest derived Irom the escrow tund shall ba cto CONTRACTOR on a Quarterly basts. This payment will be made on the first settlement alter the end of each quarter. Interest will be paid on r
average daily balance in the account curing each quarter The interest rate win bt established on the Ins: day of the Quarter and snail be in* i t t i
yield on 9\-C ay. U-woek U.S. Tientu'y Bills as osianlithed m the most recont we»kiy auction prior io the first day of the quarter by Ihe Dcpt'in,,
of Tioasury.
15. The CONTRACTOR agrees and ii is mutually understood thai if CONTRACTOR, or Its employees and/or agents used in the performance of r
Agreement, shall collect any sums of money Irom customers on account of bills rendered to customers by CARRIER, during (he course
CONTRACTOR s operations, it will no'd such money as a trustee for CARRIER and will hold it apart irom its own funds and will deliver such mor
to CARRIER forthwith.
16. This Agreement shall noi be construed at a restriction upon CONTRACTOR s right to engage in any other business it detir**.
17. As required by 49 C F R.Part 1058. the CARRIER m i u provide identification required by governmental agencies to be alined io the £qwpment T
CON 7 RACT fJR agrees that such identification m m be so allifod only g w nng the period of the Agreement and only when the equipment it eciut
being used m the so*vice of the CARRIER ar.d rornoved from (he Equipmoni if and wnen it Is used m other service. The CONTRACT OR man ieit
identification ic CARRIER upon termination of |h«s Agreement, (n tho event CONTRACTOR fails to return auCh idenillicat<f>n, t I0O 03 <*<" 0« <c
lento by CONTRACTOR enu aoprornaio deduction made Irom CONTRACTOR s linal settlement
16. In the eveni elm^r p*rty commut a material breach of any term of lh<i Agroemoni. tha other party t l u l i have the right to terminate mis Agrecm#immediately m d hold n»e party committing tne breien iiib'e lor dimages
10 7 he CONTRACTOR s»»sii i n ' c u all diligent efforts io conduct Us operation under this Agreement to assure continued satisfaction of CARfUt'*
Customers.
20 Except lo Iht exlent otherwise- provided in Appendix 0 to this Agreement, mis Agreement shall continue m efloct for a poriod of thirty (30) diyt I'Othe day and daie first above written said term to be automatically renewed lor successive thirty (30) day periods unless either party hereto snisi g.»
to the other written nonce Of cancellation thirty (30) d#ys prior to the e*yira!ion of the initial term or any renewal theret<l.
21. It. lor any reison. CONTRACTOR ma'f fail to complete transportation of commodities In transit or abandons a shipment or otherwise sutjec:
CARRIER to labilities to shippers or governmental agencies on account of the acts or omissions of CONTRACTOR en route. CONTRACTOR •«
pressiy agroes thai CARRIER siuil have mo right lo complete performance using trie same or olhor equipment, and hold CONTRACTOR ua&te >c
th» ro*i thereof and for any other damages. CONTRACTOR hereby waives any recourse against CARRIER for aucn action end agrees to relmou'K
•. •%.mifcruor any costs and e*pontes arising out of such completion of such trip, and lo pay to CARRIER any damages lor which CARRtER may o*.
iiabiu <•< snip r ar aritmg out of such breach of contract by CONTRACTOR.
22. Tnit Ay.cement constitutes the entire Agreement and understanding beiwoen the parties and shall not be modified.altered, changed or amended ir
any respect unless in writing and s>gned by both parties.
23. The parties intend to create by this Agreement the relationship ol CARRIER and INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR and not an E M P U O Y E R - I UPi Or£E relationship. Neither the CONTRACTOR nor its employees are to be eonu'dered employees of the CARRIER at any time under any circuT>»ta'»Cci
lor any purpose Neither pert is the agent of the olhei and neither party shall have the right to bind the other by contract or otherwit* except as i..v, »,r.
epeeifieeUy nmvHind
24. A wa'vorpy eitrier party at anytime o' any of the terms, conditions, or covenants ollhlt Agreoment. orofenydefeuiiorbreacnahaiinot bent urn to c
taken as a waiver at anytime tnereatie' of the same or any other term, condition or covenant herein contained, nor of the strict and prompt performance thoroof
Any term, condition or covenant harem contained that is held to be invalid by any court of competent lurisdletion mall be considered deleted lror~
thii Agreement, but such deletion snail in no wcy affect any other term, condition or covenant herein contained or the parties' obligation! wun
respect meieto
?S It is ig«eed met each and all of me ngnts. options or remedies undtt ihLr^gTAmeni are cumulative, and no one of m«m malt be exclusive o' the
otner or exclusive 0' **f remedies 0'Ovtdtd by lew. and thai exercise of>6ne rigpi. option or remedy by either party shall not impair thai party • r.gMj
IO my other rlgnt. option or remtCy.
/
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parl.es hereio nave executed mis Agreernes/tnis
f^ ^ ' S * '
oey ofend » m « i nail Of coni id tied b<nd«ng upon bom parlies and snail remain IK/ull force %it a l i*<TuTT>p 11 and •tr ,4, *'jwuelled accord»no I M m teimt o' in<»
Agt«0intfli

CONTRA&^CR
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*i< ^ ^

' ,

"C

(me -CONTRACTOR-).

WITNESSED. .HAT.
WHCRC AS me CARRIER, en I n i i ' i l i u For Mire U 0 t 0 r C«*rt»r. operating under • Certificate Of Public Convenience end Necessity or Perm.. »u>*e c
fry me i M . n i i u Commerce C»mm, M .on r i C C - ) . en* s»wr»went 10 • •empties Mom »ti«omt« regulation IPtCttieO in the Interstate Co«m»fci Act •>•
f#flui|flO«« thereunder, withes 10 Obiem transportation througn »n agreement whh CONTRACTOR: and
WHEREAS. CONTRACTOR Ii engaged m t f * business of trensperling freight by motor vehicle »f»d
NOW. THEREFORE, in consideration of tht mutual covenants and agreements contelned heroin, tne p»rtl#» mutually agree ai follows:
1 T M CONT RACTOR egren to « • • 'he equipment m o n eoeclhcAlly doierl*ed In Appendix A to thti Agreement. »*d by reference made i p i n heree'
(Iht -eou.pm»nr). together with drivers end all olhtr labor CONTRACTOR deems appropriate to trenepoM.load end unload on btn*l< 0 t CARRIER
• ' • « feeneif 0 t such other eerrt*real CARRIER may deiignale through eulhertiedTtrp Leeseor Interchange agreement!. i w C n commodities st me
CARRIER may msfce available to the CONTRACTOR. The CARRIER egrees lo make commodities evaliebi* from tlmt to time tor tremportation by
me CONT RACT OR. nowover. this shell not be construed es an egroomonl by the CARRIER to fumleh. nor lha CONTRACTOR to accept any ipaclf'C
number of load! or pounds of Ireight for irantportttion at any perlicuftr time or any particular place.
2. It (i understood *r\6 agreed mat me performance of thu Agreement, end tha relationship of the partial hereundor than be. (o (he extent (net they are
applicable. In aeeordanee with th* requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. and me rules and reputations of the ICC and the U.S. Department
• f Transportation r O O T ) . at modified and amended from lime to time.
3. The CONTRACTOR It hot obligated to purchase or rem any products, equipment, or services from the CARRIER as a condition to entering into this
Agreement.
4. For each trip made by the CONTRACTOR under the terms of mis Agreement, the CARRIER agrees, with such exceptions as agreed lo bsiwten
CARRIER »^ CONTRACTOR, and specifically provided for on CARRIER'S prenumbered trip record Issued to CONTRACTOR or Its driver (or escn
trip, lo pay CONTRACTOR according to the terms of the Schedule eel forth in Appendix B to this Agreement, which may be modified from time to
lime by mutual agreement of me parties.
This amount shall constitute lull.payment to CONTRACTOR, Including all payments for piek*ups. delivery and transportation between points o'
origin »nd destination and all loading end unloading Any amounts overpaid by CARRIER for pickup, delivery, overcherge claims on previous leads
and simitar items shall be deducted from this amount. The CARRIER wilt make available to CONTRACTOR for its examination, upon reasonable
request, copies of its tariffs.
5. As i9Q\jir»6 by i t C.F.R. f 1057.12(g). the CARRIER shell sortie with CONTRACTOR within IS days after the CONTRACTOR submits, by mall or in
person, the neeessary delivery documents and other paperwork concerning a trip m the service of the CARRIER The reuuired documents snsti
Include all signed delivery receipts, and related shipping documents. Including bills of lading driver's daily logs, mileage repens, vehicle inspection
rtperti and such other evidence of proper delivery as may be reouired by the Rules and Regulations of the ICC or the OCT ft Is understood and
agreed that alt of the aforementioned documents and/or related documents may contain information relating exclusively to CARRIER'S business
and must not be released to any parties other man duly authorized CARRIER personnel.
In eny case where the CONTRACTOR has secured sn advance of any kino from me CARRIER, or If mere shall be any other amounts Cut to me CARRIER, or to initiates o» the CARRIER from the CONTRACTOR or CONTRACTORS authorized agents or employees, me CARRIER shall be
authorized to deduct the amount of such advance or other emounts tio* to the CARRIER from tho CONTRACTOR in settling wim CONTRACTOR
under the terms of the Agreement In aodiiion, me CARRIER shad hive a period of thirty (30) days alter termination of mis Agreement to verily the
account of the CONTRACTOR as to money owed ma CONTRACTOR and to make appiopriate deductions before final settlement.
6. The CONTRACTOR recognizes the CARRIER'S business of providing motor carrier transportation services to the public is subject to regulation by
the Federal Government acting through the ICC and the DOT. and by ve> ./us state and local governments The CONTRACTOR snail hevi me
responsibility ot
a Maintaining o< causing me Equipment to be maintained In i? - state of i«p*»r itQuired by all applicable regulations;
b. Operating me Equipment in accord witn a» applicable regulations:
e. Utilizing oni y tnose drivers to operate the Equipment who are qualified u*6»r an applicable regulations:
d. Doing all erne' things necessary to conduct me transportation services provided in this Agreement in accord with all sopiicsbie regulations.
7. Tne CONTRACTOR snail determine me means and methods of the performance of all transportation services undenaken by me CONTRACTOR
under this Agreement Tne CONTRACTOR has and shall retain all responiibihty lor:
a. Hiring, letting the wages, hours and working conditions and ed|uit)ng l»io grievances of. Supervising, training, disciplining and tiring all driven,
driver s helpers §r\cs other workers deemed necessary by CONTRACTOR for tne performance of Its obligetions under tne terms of mis
Agreement. * M c n drivers, drivers' helpers, and omer workers are and shall remain the employees of the CONTRACTOR.
b Seteeting. purchasing or leasing, financing, and maintaining or causing the Eouipment to be maintained.
C. Paying all operating expense Including, but not limited to, all eapenses of fuel lor Equipment, roed taxes, fuel er mileage taxes, fines to' perking.
moving or weight violations (except that CARRIER shall be responsible for fines lor overweight and oversized iraiiert when treiierj' are pro*
loaded, sealed, or the .load is containerized, and lor Improperly permitted ever.dimension loads, unless the violation results from me act or
omission of the CONTRACTOR), empty mlieege. tolls, ferries, detention tnd accessorial services, or any other levies or assessments resulting
from the performance of this Ayroemenl.
d. Purchasing luel in the amount necessary to balanee luel taxes dueineaehstsie CONTRACTOR agrees lo keep and make available fueitickels.
drivers records and other documents necessary for reporting purposes. CONTRACTOR further authorizes CARRIER lo deduct from each
settlement the total amount necessary to compensate CARRIER for the amount It must pay for CONTRACTOR'S failure to bslsnce such luet
purchases
B. The CONTRACTOR has and shall retain sole financial responsibility for aft Federal highway use tasea. withholding and employment taxes tiv to
Federal, state or local governments on account of drivers, drivers' helpers and other workers deemed necessary by CONTRACTOR lor the
performance of its obligations vnatt the terms of this Agreement. Tne CONTRACTOR egrees lo save and hold harmless tne CAnniER front any
etaims by drivers, drivers' helpers enc othor worker* used by the CONTRACTOR, or by any Federal, state or local governmental agency, on account
ot wlmnoiomg and employment taxes, or m r ether actions arising from the CONTRACTOR'S relationship with its employees
9. As reouired by 49 CFR |1D5?.12(k). responaibility for obtaining Insurence coverage shall be as toflows:
a. The CARRIER shaft Obtain and maintain In force e.>d effeet during the entire term of thu Agreement Jneurance coverage for me protection or the
public purmtrM to ICC regulations under 49 U.S.C. |10l27.
b. The CONTRACTOR shall obtain end maintain in force and affect Workmen's Compensation Insurance (with Aft States Enso'iement) to me lull
extent of staiutory limits of all states In which work will be perlormed pursuant to the terms of mis Agreement covering itieif. its drivers. driven*
helpers and laborers employed by ft In me pertormence of this Agreement. and man lurniah CARRIER witn a cooy of policy evidencing iwcn
coverage or a Certificate of fnsurance In lieu thereof. CONTRACTOR agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and hold CARR«CR nsrmien Worn
and agiinsl any claim, loss or damage brought or alleged by CONTRACTOR or its employees egalnst CARRIER lor any Injury. Including death.
lo CONTRACTOR or Its employees resulting from the performenee of this Agreement.
c Tne CONTRACTOR agrees lo obtain m d maintain in full force end affect during the entire period of this Agreement. Bobtail and Oeadhend
Insurance Coverage with respect to public liability »r\6 property damage in me limits of $250,000 for »ny perton. $750,000 for any accident, and
IS0.0O0 prooeily damage in any eecident concerning the Equipment end/Of CARRIER'S eouipment and egrees to furnish evidence o' SUCH
coverage to C A R R I E R and arrange for CARRIER to be named es additional Insured under euch policy.
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CALL IN INF0PKM10N TO MARY BACKEKSTOSE
IMMEDIATELY. THEN SENT A PHOTO £DFY OF
COMPLETED FORM TO A&A INC. FOR OUR F I L E S .
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LYNH TRANSPORTATION - SALT LAKE C I T Y * *
V~<r-'~(,
OWNER/OPERATOR
* & * * WKTOK WKGSMrr. » , C3*. W
Effective Date of Coverage

//sir//

X3

Name of Owner/Operator

K^//c

/-/

Address

CO. UNIT «

75<TW

YEAR

MAKE

/?W)
/?hi~£*

^<*.c,

,

(\^t

SERIAL I

2.

VALUE

J
LOSS PAYABLES:

DRIVER INFORMATION
tfce^el
Address 7 < C A ; rze«+r^sL

0.^

Date of B i r t h -7-3-yflr
Social Security <3£--£,3-V6-57

.

( & s on License)
(as an Lioense)

License I ! <rOL\ frC
S t a t e of Issue u ^ u ,

FOR MY CONVBOINCE, I REQUEST THE ABOVE MOTOR CARRIER TO DEDUCT MONTHLY
FROM SBTTUEKaOS DUE ME, ANY FREKIUMS I MAY OWE THE INSURANCE CARRIER
AND RQ4IT THAT AMOUNT TO TOE AGENT AM) AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

" ^"Signature
S i g n a t u r e of Cfc?ner/Ope:
Signed by t h e Safety D i r e c t o r —
—-^
CVner/Operator
COVERAGE DESIRED:
Bobtail

V

Physical Damage Y

0012
Workers Compensation

V

Exhibit

2

